The intermediate alternative effect: Considering a small tradeoff increases subsequent willingness to make large tradeoffs by Paolacci, Gabriele et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 384–392
Journal of
CONSUMER
PSYCHOLOGYThe intermediate alternative effect: Considering a small tradeoff increases
subsequent willingness to make large tradeoffs
Gabriele Paolacci a,⁎, Katherine A. Burson b, Scott I. Rick b
a Department of Management, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 873 Cannaregio, 30121 Venice, Italy
b Department of Marketing, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
Received 1 November 2010; revised 14 March 2011; accepted 18 April 2011
Available online 1 June 2011Abstract
Prior research has consistently demonstrated that people are reluctant to trade a good they own for an alternative good, particularly when the
alternative (or “target”) represents a substantial departure from the “endowment”. We demonstrate that the endowment effect can be reduced by
first making participants consider trading their endowment for an intermediate alternative (which shares some characteristics of the endowment
and some characteristics of the target). We find that this “intermediate alternative effect” operates primarily by shifting one's reference point in the
direction of the target alternative. Even when the intermediate alternative is not adopted, the extent to which one's endowment is treated as a
reference point is weakened, which can also facilitate subsequent trading.
© 2011 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Endowment effect; Loss aversion; Decision making; Reference point; Prospect theoryCountless studies have demonstrated that ownership of a
good makes people reluctant to trade it for an alternative (e.g.,
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990). This “endowment effect”
(Thaler 1980) implies that consumers may make suboptimally
conservative choices, such as keeping their current allotment
(e.g., an inexpensive drug that has some side effects) although
they might prefer an alternative (e.g., a more expensive drug
that has no side effects) when asked to choose between the two.
Endowment effects are most often interpreted as a manifestation
of reference-dependent preferences that exhibit loss aversion—
the tendency for losses to have greater hedonic impact than
comparable gains (e.g., Thaler 1980; Tversky & Kahneman
1981, 1986). Loss aversion contributes to the widespread (and
often costly) influence of defaults on decision-making (e.g.,
Johnson & Goldstein 2003; Thaler & Sunstein 2008).⁎ Corresponding author. Fax: +39 0412348701.
E-mail addresses: paolacci@unive.it (G. Paolacci), kburson@umich.edu
(K.A. Burson), srick@umich.edu (S.I. Rick).
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2011 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2011.04.005We demonstrate a straightforward method to reduce the
common reluctance to trade an endowment for a “target
alternative.”We propose that the process of deciding whether or
not to trade the endowment for an “intermediate alternative” (an
option that possesses characteristics of both the endowment and
the target alternative) subsequently reduces the extent to which
trading for the target alternative is viewed as a loss, which in
turn stimulates trading. We propose that this “intermediate
alternative effect” operates primarily by shifting one's reference
point in the direction of the target alternative (among people
who actually adopt the intermediate). However, even when the
intermediate alternative is not adopted, the extent to which
one's endowment is treated as a reference point is weakened,
which may also facilitate subsequent trading.
Theoretically, we build upon work on reference dependence
and similarity. We anticipate that adopting the intermediate
alternative will shift one's reference point toward the target
alternative, which should make the prospect of trading for the
target alternative feel like less of a loss. This intuition stems
from research suggesting that the similarity of alternatives may


















Fig. 1. The basic experimental paradigm. Note that each arrow represents a
single choice. There is one choice in the Baseline condition and two choices in
the Intermediate condition. The second choice in the Intermediate condition
depends on whether the intermediate alternative is adopted. If the intermediate
alternative is rejected, the second choice is between the endowment and the
target (link 2). If the intermediate is adopted, the second choice is between the
intermediate alternative and the target (link 2′).
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Knippenberg 1998). In all such studies, the number of trades
from an endowment to a target alternative increased with the
similarity or substitutability between the endowment and the
target. For example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found
that Harvard employees were more likely to choose a slightly
modified medical plan than to choose a new plan as a substitute
for their current plan. Reference dependence and loss aversion
together explain this moderation. When the consumer examines
an alternative to her endowment, its relative attractiveness
depends on the magnitude of the entailed tradeoff such that
small tradeoffs are usually preferred to large tradeoffs. More
formally, in prospect theory terms (Kahneman & Tversky 1979),
it is generally the case that if xby, then v(x)+v(–x)Nv(y)+v(–y).
Thus, people who refuse to “leap” from their endowment to a
distant target alternative might instead “walk” to it. Other work
also supports the notion that people will be willing to make what
they perceive as small tradeoffs. For example, there is some
evidence that small gains actually loom larger than small losses
(e.g., Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann 2007).
Intermediate alternatives may help to facilitate subsequent
trading even when they are rejected. Knetsch and Wong (2009)
recently argued that endowment effects are largely dependent
on the extent to which the endowment conveys the reference
state. In particular, they showed that the consideration of
counterfactual endowments may undermine the strength of the
individual's reference point (i.e., the extent to which one's
endowment serves as the salient reference point against which
potential trades are evaluated). This is consistent with recent
work that has demonstrated that individuals with extensive
trading experience, such as professional sports card dealers (List
2003) and real estate investors (Genesove & Mayer 2001), are
less reluctant to part with their endowments than are those with
less experience. Similarly, putting participants in a less
emotional trading mindset has been shown to reduce loss
aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009). Reconciling such
evidence with a reference point account of the endowment
effect (cf. Knetsch & Wong 2009), we maintain that facing an
opportunity to trade one's endowment for an intermediate
alternative can weaken the extent to which the endowment is
treated as the reference point. This, in turn, should make the
prospect of trading away one's endowment feel like less of a
loss. In essence, rejecting the intermediate may subsequently
make the decision whether to exchange one's endowment for
the target alternative feel more like a choice between receiving
the endowment and receiving the target alternative (i.e., help to
turn “owners” into “choosers”).
Of course, even if the reference point is weakened, it is
unlikely that intermediate-rejectors will completely re-set their
reference point (i.e., behave purely as choosers who have no
endowment), since they still physically retain their endowment.
However, intermediate-adopters, whose reference point has
shifted toward the target, must endure only a small loss to obtain
it. Moreover, if the loss is indeed perceived as small, the
prospect of gaining the target might be weighted more heavily
than the prospect of losing the intermediate (cf. Harinck et al.
2007), further increasing the likelihood of trading. Accordingly,we anticipate that the overall intermediate alternative effect will
be driven primarily by intermediate-adopters.
Taken together, the reasoning above leads to the following
hypotheses:
H1. People who consider trading their endowment for an
intermediate alternative will subsequently be more likely to
trade for a distant (target) alternative than people who do not
initially consider trading their endowment for an intermediate
alternative.
H1a. Intermediate-adopters will be more likely to trade for the
target than intermediate-rejectors.
We begin by examining the intermediate alternative effect
and its underlying reference point dynamics using the basic
paradigm illustrated in Fig. 1. Imagine a consumer who is
reluctant to trade her endowment for a distant target alternative
even though she would prefer such an alternative in a simple
binary choice. We propose that this endowment effect can be
overcome by employing a two-step trading process from the
endowment to the target alternative (see Intermediate panel of
Fig. 1). Specifically, consumers who would refuse to trade their
endowment for the target alternative (path 1 in the Baseline
panel of Fig. 1) may ultimately do so by first considering trades
for intermediate alternatives (path 1-then-2′ or path 2 in the
Intermediate panel). We argue that considering whether or not
to trade one's endowment for an intermediate alternative
subsequently reduces the extent to which trading for the target
alternative is viewed as a loss, either by weakening the reference
Fig. 2. Study 1 and Study 3 theater maps.
1 To make the task as clear as possible, participants were reminded of the
position of their current seats throughout the experiment. In particular, while
making their choices, participants could observe each alternative in a distinct
map similar to the panels in Fig. 2.
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rejected) or by shifting it toward the target alternative (if the
intermediate is adopted). This will, in turn, increase the
likelihood of trading to the target alternative.
Study 1: Trading theater seats
In Study 1 we examine whether there is an intermediate
alternative effect by comparing trading rates (the proportion of
people who ultimately adopt the target alternative) between a
Baseline condition and an Intermediate condition (see Fig. 1). In
a hypothetical concert scenario, participants were endowed with
seats in a theater and decided whether to trade for alternative
seats characterized by tradeoffs (proximity to friends and
proximity to the stage). Regardless of the features of the original
endowment, we predicted that participants who had previously
encountered an opportunity to trade the endowment for an
intermediate alternative would be more likely to trade to the
distant target alternative than those who had not encountered the
intermediate alternative.
Procedure
One hundred twenty-two adults (mean age=33.4, 59%
female) participated via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online
service validated as a survey website (Horton et al. in press;
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis 2010). Participants were asked
to imagine that they and three of their friends would soon attend
a concert of their favorite artist. Each participant was then
assigned the hypothetical task of buying all four tickets based
on two criteria: 1) the four seats should be as close as possible to
the stage in order to have the best possible view; and 2) the four
seats should be as close as possible to each other in order to
enjoy the concert together. The cover story reported that at the
time of purchase there was only one set of tickets available, and
we counterbalanced across participants which endowment they
received: either four seats that were superior on proximity to
each other (Fig. 2, Panel A, henceforth referred to as Fig. 2A),
or four seats that were superior on proximity to the stage (Fig. 2,
Panel B, henceforth referred to as Fig. 2B). (Complete
instructions and stimuli are available from the authors upon
request.)
We randomly assigned participants to either a Baseline
condition or an Intermediate condition. Participants in the
Baseline condition were simply provided with the opportunity to
keep their endowed set of seats or trade them for a set of seats that
ostensibly just became available, namely the target alternative
(those who were endowed with the seats in Fig. 2A were offered
the seats in Fig. 2B, and vice versa). Participants in the
Intermediate condition were initially given the opportunity to
trade their endowed set of seats for an intermediate set of seats
(Fig. 2, Panel C, henceforth referred to as Fig. 2C). The seats in
Fig. 2C are intermediate on both the “proximity to stage”
dimension (closer to the stage than the Fig. 2A seats, but farther
than the Fig. 2B seats) and the “proximity to friends” dimension
(less clustered than the Fig. 2A seats, but more clustered than the
Fig. 2B seats). All Intermediate participants (whether or not theydecided to trade for the intermediate alternative) were then asked
whether they wanted to trade their current seats for the target
alternative.1
Comparing trading rates in the Baseline and the Intermediate
condition reveals whether or not consideration of an interme-
diate alternative attenuates the endowment effect. Regardless of
whether participants naturally prioritize proximity to stage or
proximity to friends, because we counterbalance whether
participants are endowed with one option or the other, the
classical economic prediction is that half of the participants in
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endowment effect.2
Results and discussion
Consistent with prior research, we observed an endowment
effect in the Baseline condition. Only 29.6% of participants in
the Baseline condition chose to trade away their endowed set of
seats for the target alternative seats, a proportion significantly
lower than the normative benchmark of 50% (χ2(1)=8.96,
pb .01). However, consistent with H1, participants who were
presented with an intermediate alternative were significantly
more likely to trade. Among participants in the Intermediate
condition, 47.1% ultimately traded their endowed set of seats
for the target alternative seats. This trading rate is significantly
higher than the 29.6% trading rate in the Baseline condition
(χ2(1)=3.83, p=.05). Moreover, 47.1% is not significantly
different from the 50% normative benchmark (χ2(1)= .24,
p=.63), meaning that the endowment effect is statistically non-
existent in the Intermediate condition. In addition, in the
Intermediate condition, participants who adopted the interme-
diate alternative were more likely to trade for the target than
people who rejected the intermediate (66.7% vs. 41.5%, χ2(1)=
2.97, p=.08). This provides support for H1a and is consistent
with our proposition that adopting an intermediate alternative
does indeed shift the reference point toward the target, whereas
rejecting an intermediate alternative can only weaken it.
Study 2: Trading chocolate
The difference in subsequent trading between intermediate-
adopters and intermediate-rejectors observed in Study 1
suggests that reference point shifting is the critical component
of the intermediate alternative effect. However, it must be
acknowledged that two things differ between intermediate-
adopters and intermediate-rejectors: Unlike intermediate-
rejectors, (i) intermediate-adopters have parted with the
endowment and (ii) have obtained the intermediate alterna-
tive. The current results cannot pinpoint whether the
difference between intermediate-adopters and intermediate-
rejectors is primarily driven by (i) parting with the endowment
or (ii) obtaining the intermediate. If the trading-rate difference
between intermediate-adopters and intermediate-rejectors is
primarily driven by parting with the endowment, then
reference point shifting is not the essential component of the
intermediate alternative effect. Instead, that might suggest that
the effect is driven primarily by reference point weakening
(and that parting with the endowment by accepting the2 To explain this prediction formally, imagine that a share p of all participants
prefer the close-to-stage seats to the clustered ones. Then, assuming no
reference dependence, in the condition where participants are endowed with
close-to-stage seats, a share 1−p should exchange the close-to-stage seats fo
the clustered seats; in the condition where participants are endowed with
clustered seats, a share p should exchange clustered seats for close-to-stage
seats. If the number of participants is the same across conditions, this would
produce an average trading rate of (p+1−p)/2=1/2. Therefore, a trading rate
lower than 50% is evidence of an endowment effect.
 
(The Target)
Fig. 3. The Parallel Alternative condition. There are two choices in the Parallel
condition. The second choice in the Parallel condition depends on whether the
parallel alternative is adopted. If the parallel alternative is rejected, the second
choice is between the endowment and the target (link 2). If the parallel
alternative is adopted, the second choice is between the parallel alternative and
the target (link 2′).r
intermediate simply does a better job of reference point
weakening than rejecting the intermediate).
Study 2 examines the relative contributions of parting with
the endowment and obtaining the intermediate by introducing a
Parallel condition (see Fig. 3). Specifically, we examine the
ability of a “parallel alternative” (which differs only superfi-
cially from the endowment) to increase subsequent trading.
Notice that the act of adopting the parallel alternative requires
parting with the endowment, but it cannot shift the reference
point toward the target. If the intermediate alternative effect is
primarily driven by the reference point shifting toward the target
when that intermediate is adopted, the ultimate trading rates
should not increase when a parallel alternative is considered,
since it cannot shift one's reference point toward the target, even
if adopted. Indeed, if reference point shifting is the primary
component of the intermediate alternative effect, the following
predictions can be made:
H2. Relative to the Baseline condition, trading rates will not
increase when a parallel alternative is considered instead of an
intermediate alternative.
H2a. People who initially adopt an intermediate alternative will
be more likely to trade for the target alternative than people who
initially adopt a parallel alternative.In addition to testing these hypotheses, Study 2 examines
whether the intermediate alternative effect persists when
participants must make real choices between goods. Specifi-
cally, participants were confronted with real choices between
bags of customized milk chocolate M&M's. Participants traded
388 G. Paolacci et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 384–392between bags of M&M's that were characterized by tradeoffs
(number of bags and aesthetic appeal).
Procedure
One hundred and twelve female participants at University of
Michigan completed this study in exchange for a $10
participation fee. They were randomly assigned to one
condition of a 2 (endowment: university M&M's or spider
M&M's)×3 (path to target: baseline, intermediate, or parallel
alternative) between-participants design. Participants were
initially endowed with either two small bags of M&M's
customized with University of Michigan's logo or with four
small bags of M&M's customized with an unpleasant picture of
a spider (see Fig. 4). These two options were thus characterized
by a relatively large tradeoff in terms of the quantity of
chocolate and the aesthetic appeal of the candies (a pretest
indicated that females found university M&M's more attractive
than spider M&M's). To reinforce participants' feeling of
ownership for the M&M's they initially received, we first asked
them to estimate the weight of a single bag (all bags weighed
1.15 oz.), and paid them $1 at the end of the study if their
estimate fell within ±0.25 oz of the actual weight.
Participants in the Baseline condition saw no intermediate
alternative and were simply asked if they wanted to trade their
two bags of university M&M's for four bags of spider M&M's,
or vice versa. Participants in the Intermediate condition were
first given the opportunity to trade their endowment for anFig. 4. Sample stimuli from Study 2, Clockwise, from upper left: Solid university
M&M's, outlined universityM&M's, outlined spiderM&M's, solid spiderM&M's.intermediate alternative composed of one bag of university
M&M's and two bags of spider M&M's. After this choice,
participants were offered the opportunity to trade their current
allotment for the target alternative (two bags of university
M&M's if they began with four bags of spider M&M's, or four
bags of spider M&M's if they began with two bags of university
M&M's). Participants in the Parallel condition were not initially
offered an intermediate, but rather a slightly modified version of
their initial endowment. These parallel alternatives were
identical to the initial endowment except that the image was
slightly different. For instance, a participant endowed with four
bags of solid brown spider M&M's was given the opportunity to
trade for four bags of brown-outlined spider M&M's (Fig. 4).
Given its trivial difference from the endowment, there is little
reason to suspect that adopting the parallel alternative would
shift the reference point toward the target. If intermediate-
adopters trade more for the target than intermediate-rejectors
because their reference point is shifted, intermediate-adopters
should also be more likely to trade for the target than parallel-
adopters.
Results and discussion
Consistent with prior research, we observe an endowment
effect in the Baseline condition. Participants in the Baseline
condition traded their endowed set of M&M's 25.0% of the
time, indicative of a significant endowment effect (χ2(1)=9.00,
pb .01). By contrast, 47.2% of participants in the Intermediate
condition traded their M&M's for the target alternative. This
trading rate is significantly higher than the trading rate in the
Baseline condition (χ2(1)=3.85, pb .05), illustrating once again
that considering an intermediate alternative substantially in-
creases trading and eliminates the endowment effect (47.2% vs.
50%, χ2(1)= .06, p=.81).
We next examined the pattern of trading for the Parallel
condition. There, 35.0% of participants traded from the
endowment to the target alternative. Although the difference
in trading rates between the Parallel condition and the Baseline
condition (35.0% vs. 25.0%) is directionally consistent with the
idea that considering trading away the endowment weakens the
reference point, this difference was not significant (χ2(1)=0.90,
p=.34). Indeed, consistent with H2, participants in the Parallel
condition also exhibited an endowment effect (35.0% vs.
50.0%, χ2(1)=3.60, p=.06).
To provide a focused test of H2a, we compare the behavior
of adopters and rejectors in the Intermediate and Parallel
conditions. Fig. 5 summarizes the results. Consistent with Study
1, intermediate-adopters were significantly more likely to trade
for the target than intermediate-rejectors (63.2% vs. 29.4%,
χ2(1)=4.10, pb .05). By contrast, parallel-adopters were no
more likely to trade for the target than parallel-rejectors (33.3%
vs. 36.4%, χ2(1)=0.04, p=.84). Most importantly, whereas
intermediate-rejectors and parallel-rejectors did not significant-
ly differ in the extent to which they ultimately traded for the
target (29.4% vs. 36.4%, χ2(1)=0.21, p=.65), intermediate-
adopters were nearly twice as likely as parallel-adopters to






















Fig. 5. Trading rates for the target by condition in Study 2.
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weaken one's reference point, but not shift it in the direction of
the target, this large difference suggests that reference point
shifting is the critical component of the intermediate alternative
effect.
Given the demonstrated importance of reference point
shifting via intermediate-adoption, it is worth considering
whether, and to what extent, reference point weakening via
intermediate-rejection actually contributes to the intermediate
alternative effect. Though we have shown that reference point
shifting is critical, it is difficult to precisely measure the relative
contributions of shifting vs. weakening. It is tempting to
compare trading rates for the target among intermediate-rejectors
and Baseline participants. Across studies, intermediate-rejectors
were about 4–12% more likely to trade for the target than
Baseline participants (41.5% vs. 29.6% in Study 1; 29.4% vs.
25.0% in Study 2). However, this is essentially an apples-to-
oranges comparison because we know that all intermediate-
rejectors prefer the endowment to the intermediate, but some
Baseline participants would undoubtedly have preferred the
intermediate to the endowment. Arguably, then, this 4–12%
estimate understates the extent to which reference point
weakening contributes to the overall effect. (The appropriate,
but impossible comparison would be between intermediate-
rejectors and Baseline participants who would have rejected the
intermediate.)
The Parallel condition is another relevant source of data.
Since the parallel alternative differs only slightly from the
endowment, accepting or rejecting it is unlikely to do anything
other than weaken one's reference point. (Indeed, the difference
in trading rates for the target between parallel-adopters and
parallel-rejectors does not even approach significance; p=.84.)
The overall 10% difference in trading rates for the target
between Parallel participants and Baseline participants (35% vs.
25%) provides another estimate of the benefits of reference
point weakening. Thus, the results suggest that weakening plays
a small, but non-negligible role in the overall effect.
Study 2 served several purposes. Using real products, we
replicated the intermediate alternative effect and, as in Study 1,
found that it was primarily driven by intermediate-adopters
rather than intermediate-rejectors. In addition, by introducing aParallel condition, we were able to determine whether the
intermediate alternative effect is primarily driven by reference
point shifting or by reference point weakening. The large
trading difference between intermediate-adopters and parallel-
adopters suggests that effect is primarily driven by reference
point shifting.
One limitation of Studies 1 and 2, however, is that they
measure only participants' behavior. The trading data is
consistent with our proposed process of reference point
weakening and shifting, but does not directly measure those
reference points. Therefore, in Study 3 we use a more sensitive
measure of participants' reference points: We measure contin-
uous satisfaction ratings that likely correspond more closely to
reference points than binary trading decisions.
Study 3: Judging theater seats
In Study 3 we used a concert scenario similar to Study 1 to
provide a more sensitive test of the precise influence of
intermediate alternatives on reference points. We manipulated
whether or not participants were endowed with a set of seats,
and among people who were endowed with seats, we
manipulated whether or not they were offered an alternative
that represented a small tradeoff (for a total of three between-
participants conditions). We then asked all participants how
satisfied they would be with a set of seats that was dominated by
the endowment. Degree of satisfaction with the dominated
alternative arguably reflects the perceived distance between a
participant's current state and the dominated alternative (such
that a larger distance between the two would lead to lower
satisfaction with the dominated alternative). If reference points
are shifted by adopting the intermediate alternative, dissatis-
faction with a dominated option should be greatest among
intermediate-adopters. If rejecting an intermediate weakens
one's reference point, the satisfaction ratings of intermediate-
rejectors should be similar to the satisfaction ratings of non-
endowed participants.
Procedure
Two hundred adults (mean age=35.6, 61% female) recruited
on Amazon Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to one of
the three conditions: Baseline, Intermediate, and No Endow-
ment. In the Baseline condition, participants were endowed with
a set of side-by-side seats that were moderately far from the
stage (Fig. 2A). They were then asked to imagine that they had
to move to a set of dominated side-by-side seats in the back row
(even further back than the endowed set; Fig. 2, Panel D), and
were asked how satisfied they would be with those seats on a 1–
7 scale (1=extremely unsatisfied, 7=extremely satisfied). In the
Intermediate condition, participants were first asked whether
they wanted to move to a set of less clustered seats in the middle
of the theater (the intermediate alternative in Study 1; Fig. 2C),
and were then asked how satisfied they would be with the
dominated seats. In the No Endowment condition, participants
were simply asked how satisfied they would be with the
dominated seats.
390 G. Paolacci et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 384–392Results and discussion
Consistent with reference dependence, participants in the
Baseline condition were significantly less satisfied with the
dominated seats than participants in the No Endowment
condition (3.85 vs. 4.90, t(123)=2.11, pb .05). However,
there was no significant difference between participants who
considered and rejected the intermediate alternative and
participants in the No Endowment condition (4.37 vs. 4.90,
t(120)=1.13, p= .26). These patterns suggest that, as pre-
dicted, rejecting the intermediate weakened the reference
point (though not completely re-setting it to a state like that
before they were endowed). In addition, participants who
considered and adopted the intermediate alternative were less
satisfied with the dominated seats than Baseline participants
(2.83 vs. 3.85, t(78)=1.87, p= .07), suggesting their reference
point had shifted as a result of the trade.
These results fully support our weakening and shifting
reference point account of the intermediate alternative effect.
Rejecting an intermediate alternative to one's endowment
weakens the reference state instilled by the endowment, and
adopting such an alternative shifts the reference point. Taken
together with the results from Studies 1 and 2, the results
strongly suggest that intermediate alternatives reduce the
endowment effect by weakening reference points (if rejected)
and shifting reference points (if adopted).
General discussion
Too often, consumers are stuck with choices they inherited
from the past, rejecting favorable alternatives to their endow-
ments because the losses they perceive are too difficult to ignore
(e.g., Okada 2001). We demonstrate that reluctance to trade can
be reduced by first providing the consumer with an opportunity
to trade the endowment for a smaller tradeoff option. Through
consideration of that intermediate alternative, participants
abandoned their endowments and adopted alternatives they
likely would have rejected if forced to trade for them directly.
This paper joins a growing body of literature that identifies
context-based boundaries of the endowment effect (e.g., Lerner,
Small, & Loewenstein 2004) and contributes to our under-
standing of the endowment effect by showing that an
incremental presentation of alternatives attenuates it: In our
studies, participants who considered owning an intermediate
alternative before considering the target alternative showed no
endowment effect. We maintain that this pattern results from a
reference point mechanism that makes the trade for the target
alternative feel like less of a loss: Rejecting the intermediate
alternative weakens the reference state conveyed by the
endowment, and adopting the intermediate shifts the reference
point from the endowment toward the target.
Our work also joins a growing body of research that attempts
to shed light on how reference points develop and change over
time (e.g., Heffetz & List 2011; Köszegi & Rabin 2006). For
example, the results of Study 3 suggest that reference points are
not strictly defined by ownership (cf. Ericson & Fuster in press;
Peck & Shu 2009).Some readers may see parallels between the current research
and findings on context-dependent choices (Huber, Payne, &
Puto 1982). The present findings do not contradict existing
research on the compromise effect (Simonson 1989): Whereas
the compromise effect posits that an intermediate alternative
benefits from the presence of an extreme alternative (in terms of
choice share), we demonstrate that introducing an intermediate
before introducing an extreme alternative can subsequently
benefit the extreme alternative. Similarly, our findings are not a
replication of the attraction effect: Whereas the attraction effect
illustrates how the addition of a dominated option can pull
choice share to an extreme option, we always use a non-
dominated intermediate option.
Readers familiar with the classic foot-in-the-door (FITD)
phenomenon, whereby willingness to comply with a large
request is increased when preceded by a small request, may also
see overlap between this effect and the intermediate alternative
effect. However, a closer look reveals several distinctions. Note
that the intermediate alternative effect is a way to increase
willingness to make tradeoffs between losses and gains,
whereas FITD is a way to increase willingness to accept losses.
Specifically, while we present participants with the opportunity
to trade something desirable for something they may or may not
find more desirable, FITD researchers attempt to coerce
participants into behavior that they find unpleasant, such as
allowing strangers into their home (Freedman & Fraser 1966).
In addition, FITD researchers do not distinguish between
people who comply and do not comply with the initial request
(adopters and rejectors, in our language). When it is reported,
the proportion of participants who comply with the first request
is typically very high (e.g., 100%, Burger & Petty 1981, p. 497).
Indeed, in a meta-analysis of FITD studies, Burger (1999, p.
305) found only one study in which the majority of participants
did not comply with the initial request. High compliance with
the initial request is not surprising given the lack of anonymity
in FITD paradigms (requests are typically made in person or
over the phone) and the fact that complying with the request
does not require parting with a salient reference state (unlike
owners deciding whether to trade away an endowment).
Moreover, all participants, whether they comply with the
small request or not, are lumped together and included in all
analyses (e.g., Burger 1999; Freedman & Fraser 1966). By
contrast, we demonstrate that intermediate alternatives operate
differently depending on whether or not they are adopted.
Finally, the FITD and intermediate alternative effects appear
to be driven by different processes. Whereas FITD is typically
attributed to self-perception, psychological reactance, a need to
remain consistent, and several other factors (Burger 1999),
those factors are not needed to explain the effectiveness of
intermediate alternatives. Instead, intermediate alternatives
appear to work by shifting or weakening reference points.
Future research should delve more deeply into the process by
which adopting an intermediate alternative influences one's
reference point. Our current data suggest that adopting the
intermediate shifts the reference point. It is possible, however,
that the reference point shift is actually a more nuanced process
of initial weakening due to mere consideration of the trade and
391G. Paolacci et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 384–392then shifting via adoption of the intermediate alternative.
Comparing an Intermediate condition like those utilized in our
studies to an Intermediate-to-Target condition, in which
participants start with an intermediate alternative and decide
whether to trade for the target, would be informative. If trading
from the endowment to the intermediate both shifts and
weakens one's reference point, subsequent trading to the target
should be greater among intermediate-adopters in the Interme-
diate condition than among participants in the Intermediate-to-
Target condition.
Our findings have practical relevance for marketers and
policy makers. We suggest that when consumers are reluctant to
undertake big changes, “smoothing” the transition process to the
final state might help. There are a number of products and
services that can be introduced and adopted (or not) in an
incremental fashion, the most salient example being digital
goods: Unless alternatives are very compelling, websites and
software manufacturers should consider introducing new
versions of their existing offers through incremental updates
to minimize the net impact of perceived losses.
For policy makers, this proposal might be utilized as a
“nudge” (Thaler & Sunstein 2008) to overcome the problem of
suboptimally conservative choices. Offering people small trades
eases the path to a potentially beneficial but controversial
alternative without forcing that trade. Consider, for instance, the
problem of insufficient saving rates among American house-
holds. Since households are accustomed to a certain level of
disposable income, they may be reluctant to save more money
(even when they know they should) because they do not want to
experience a “cut” in take-home pay (Thaler & Benartzi 2004).
Our results suggest that firms could implement successive
contribution plans that only slightly increase employees' saving
rates but eventually lead to more aggressive saving.Conclusion
Although much is understood about loss aversion and the
endowment effect, many open questions remain (cf. Johnson,
Gachter, & Herrmann 2006; McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, &
Schkade 2010; Rick 2011). Our work contributes to answering
those questions by explicating the role of weakened vs.
shifted reference points in overcoming endowment effects.
Practically, our work demonstrates a simple way to reduce the
endowment effect. Consumers who consider trading their
endowment for an intermediate alternative subsequently
demonstrate no endowment effect when deciding whether
to trade for a more distant alternative. Thus, to encourage
tradeoffs, marketers and policy makers are advised to help
people walk toward the desired outcome rather than trying to
force them to leap.Acknowledgements
The authors thank the Editor, two anonymous reviewers,
David Faro, Yuval Rottenstreich, Robert Smith, and GeorgeWu
for helpful comments. The authors are also grateful to theUniversity of Michigan Ross School of Business for financial
support.
References
Burger, J. M. (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: A multiple-
process analysis and review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3
(4), 303–325.
Burger, J. M., & Petty, R. E. (1981). The low-ball compliance technique: Task
or person commitment? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40
(3), 492–500.
Chapman, G. B. (1998). Similarity and reluctance to trade. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 11(1), 47–58.
Ericson, K. M., & Fuster, A. (in press). Expectations as endowments: Evidence
on reference-dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experi-
ments. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Freedman, J. L., & Fraser, S. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: The foot-
in-the-door technique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4,
195–202.
Genesove, D., & Mayer, C. (2001). Loss aversion and seller behavior: Evidence
from the housing market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4),
1233–1260.
Harinck, F., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Mersmann, P. (2007). When gains
loom larger than losses. Psychological Science, 18(12), 1099–1105.
Heffetz, O., & List, J. A. (2011). Is the endowment effect a reference effect?
NBER Working Paper No. w16715.
Horton, J., Rand, D., & Zeckhauser, R. (in press). The online laboratory:
Conducting experiments in a real labor market. Experimental Economics.
Huber, J., Payne, J. W., & Puto, C. (1982). Adding asymmetrically dominated
alternatives: Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. Journal
of Consumer Research, 9(1), 90–98.
Johnson, E. J., Gachter, S., & Herrmann, A. (2006). Exploring the nature of loss
aversion. Working paper, Columbia University.
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302
(5649), 1338–1339.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the
endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98
(6), 1325–1348.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
Knetsch, J. L., & Wong, W. (2009). The endowment effect and the reference
state: Evidence and manipulations. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 71(2), 407–413.
Köszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1133–1165.
Lerner, J., Small, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Heart strings and purse strings:
Effects of specific emotions on economic transactions. Psychological
Science, 15(5), 337–341.
List, J. A. (2003). Does market experience eliminate market anomalies?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 41–71.
McGraw, A. P., Larsen, J. T., Kahneman, D., & Schkade, D. (2010). Comparing
gains and losses. Psychological Science, 21(10), 1438–1445.
Okada, E. M. (2001). Trade-ins, mental accounting, and product replacement
decisions. Journal of Consumer Research, 27(4), 433–446.
Ortona, G., & Scacciati, F. (1992). New experiments on the endowment effect.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 13(2), 277–296.
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(5), 411–419.
Peck, J., & Shu, S. (2009). The effect of mere touch on perceived ownership.
Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 434–447.
Rick, S. (2011). Losses, gains, and brains: Neuroeconomics can help to answer
open questions about loss aversion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21(4),
451–461 (this issue).
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1(1), 7–59.
Simonson, I. (1989). Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and
compromise effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(2), 158–174.
392 G. Paolacci et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 384–392Sokol-Hessner, P., Hsu,M., Curley,N.G.,Delgado,M.R., Camerer, C. F.,&Phelps,
E. A. (2009). Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss aversion.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(13), 5035–5040.
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 1(1), 39–60.
Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow™: Using behavioral
economics to increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112
(1), S164–S187.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: improving decisions about
health, wealth, and happiness. : Yale University Press.Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of
decisions. The Journal of Business, 59(4), S251–S278.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A
reference-dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4),
1039–1061.
van Dijk, E., & van Knippenberg, D. (1998). Trading wine: On the endowment
effect, loss aversion, and the comparability of consumer goods. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 19(4), 485–495.
